Finding Some Strategies for Encouraging People to Cooperate in Urban Renovation Plans Based on the Game Theory

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Professor, School of Urban Design, College of Fine Arts, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran

2 MA of Urban Design, College of Fine Art, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran

Abstract

Urban planning has been done by different approaches but, a major procedure can be seen that is conversion of Top-down planning idea to Bottom-up planning idea that needs participation and cooperation of people in planning. This idea can be seen frequently in contemporary renovation plans in Iran too. In that regard, one of the most important factors in urban renovation plans is being supported by residents and encouraging them to cooperate. Achieving this goal can affect the renovation process and make economic benefits. Cooperation in urban renovation plans leads to sustainability and stability in urban fabric and its users. Cooperation and trying to improve living area can create stronger identity and sense of belonging between people and their neighbor that tends to improved life quality beside reduced renovation costs. But, how to encourage the residents to cooperate is a goal that this paper tries to reach on the base of game theory and understanding cooperators behavior. Game theory provides general mathematical techniques for analyzing situations in which two or more individuals make decisions that will influence one another`s welfare. In this way, this paper discusses the game theory and the prisoner’s dilemma game, and using a tow section model of this game to shows the way people cooperate in tow section cooperation and also shows possible conditions for cooperation. In the next step, it studies two experiences in this field: First, the renovation plan for the central part of Mashhad as one of the most important renovation plans in Iran which considered the residents’ satisfaction and participation as one of its main goals, although it almost failed to encourage them to cooperate. And the second, the renovation plan for Oudlajan bazaar in Tehran as a plan that succeeds to encourage residents to cooperate. Then it compares the results of these two cases and the results of prisoner`s dilemma model to find the best way to encourage people for cooperation. The comparison shows that The prisoner`s dilemma model is closer to the Oudlajan experience (the relatively successful case). The results shows that a complete cooperation needs a shared space that people and government can interact and play their roles in there, and also shows that the most encouraging factor for people to cooperate is to provide their benefits in cooperation process, But it should be noted that there are some factors, like using social mechanisms that can reduce the impact of economy factor somewhat. It shows that involving people from the beginning (decision making), let them trust well because, there is no risk in this section. People in a cooperation need time to make a decision and they use different strategies in this way that almost is based on other cooperators decisions and their experiences. A cooperation process should be done in different sections and the last section should not be demonstrated to people. It should be noted that none of the experiences used game theory as a basic theory for their planning process.
 

Keywords

References

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Journal of Fine Arts: Architecture & Urban Planning
Volume 18, Issue 19
January 2014
Pages 5-14

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