Informal and conditional interactions of the mayor of Tehran; A qualitative study in the urban management system of Iran

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 M. A. in Urban Management, Faculty of Architecture and Urban Planning, Iran University of Art, Tehran, Iran.

2 Assistant Professor, Department of Urban Planning, Faculty of Architecture and Urban Planning, Iran University of Art, Tehran, Iran.

Abstract

The mayor plays an important and multifaceted role  in the urban management system, with leadership being one of the most significant responsibilities. The leadership role gains meaning particularly through the mayor’s interactions with other urban actors. In the urban management system of Iran, numerous actors deal with urban issues and the mayor must engage with a wide array of them, as such improving the urban management collection requires effective cooperation and interaction among these actors.  This study’s purpose purpose is to uncover hidden structures influencing mayoral interactions at various levels and to develop adaptive strategies for managing these interactions under different circumstances. The research adopts a qualitative approach based on grounded theory methodology. From an internal perspective, it is descriptive-exploratory, while externally, it is considered practical.Semi-structured interviews were employed to collect data. Participants included Tehran's mayors, deputy mayors, district mayors, city council members, researchers, and urban experts. These participants were selected purposefully, using techniques such as snowball sampling with a total of 26 individuals determined upon reaching theoretical saturation. The interview data were analyzed through three stages of coding (open, axial, and selective) and through analytical methods such as comparison and questioning of data, facilitated by ATLAS.ti 9 software. The research findings elucidate that the informal and conditional interactions of the Mayor of Tehran are the result of teeter interactions. These teeter interactions stem from the inefficiency of the law, the centralization of the administrative-organizational structure, the method of selecting the mayor and senior managers in the municipality, and the chain politicization in the selection of urban management members. The inefficiency of laws and the centralization of the administrative-organizational structure lead to a reduction in the mayor's interactions. Chain politicization in the selection of urban management authorities results in politicized interactions. Moreover, the method of selecting the mayor and senior managers contributes to the imbalance and instability of the mayor's interactions. In response to the mayor’s teeter interactions, his strategy to maintain engagements and compensate for lost interactions is to turn to conditional and informal engagements. In essence, urban management authorities attempt to preserve their interactions across various levels through informal interactions, which occur conditionally and under specific circumstances. The consequences of such informal and conditional interactions include weakened performance and managerial instability for the mayor. Informal interactions pave the way for the personalization of these interactions, leading to the corruption of the urban management structure. Imbalanced and conditional interactions ultimately weaken the mayor's interactions and performance, resulting in the instability of their managerial tenure. Essentially, the inability of the mayor to persuade other institutions in interactions leads to unstable management, a phenomenon exemplified by the short tenures of mayors in previous periods. More precisely, informal interactions lead to the personalization of relationships, prioritizing personal interests. This ultimately results in the corruption of the urban management structure. Additionally, the imbalance and conditional nature of interactions weaken the mayor's performance and engagement with others.

Keywords

References

_ برک‌پور، ناصر و اسدی، ایرج (1401). عرصه‌های گذار به مدیریت شهری یکپارچه در ایران با تأکید بر وظایف،کارکردها و صلاحیت‌های شورای شهر و شهرداری. فصلنامه اقتصاد و برنامه‌ریزی شهری، 3(2)، 81-70. https://doi.org/10.22034/uep.2022.319517.1151
_ برک‌پور ناصر و مطهری، مهیا (۱۳۹۷). مقایسه روش انتخاب شهردار در ایران و هفت کشور اروپایی. فصلنامه مطالعات مدیریت شهری، ۱۰(۳۴)، ۶۱-۷۵. https://sanad.iau.ir/Journal/ums/Article/824682
_ سازمان ملل متحد؛ برنامه اسکان بشر (۱۳۹۲). قابلیت‌های کلیدی برای بهبود حکمرانی محلی؛ مفاهیم و استراتژی‌ها ترجمه طیبه نادرآبادی، مرتضی قلیچ و محمدعلی رمضانی. انتشارات تیسا.
_ رحمتی، محمدحسین (1391). اداره امور سازمان‌های محلی در ایران. مهربان نشر.
_ فراست‌خواه، مقصود (1395). روش تحقیق کیفی در علوم اجتماعی: با تأکید بر نظریه برپایه (گراندد تئوری ‌GTM). انتشارات آگاه.
_ فرج، سارا و شرفی، مرجان (۱۴۰۲). نقش و قدرت شهردار تهران بر روی کاغذ و در عمل. فصلنامه برنامه‌ریزی توسعه ‌شهری و‌منطقه‌ای، ۸(۲۴)، ۸۷- ۱۳۳. https://doi.org/10.22054/urdp.2022.70495.1490
_ مرادی، حسین (1395). آنچه مدیران شهری باید بدانند: گام اول؛ شهرداران نواحی. مرکز مطالعات و برنامه‌ریزی شهر تهران.
_ هانگر، جی. دیوید و ال‌ویلن، توماس (۱۳۹۳). مبانی مدیریت استراتژیک ترجمه سیدمحمد اعرابی و حمیدرضا رضوانی. دفتر پژوهش‌های فرهنگی.
_ Alba, C.R., & Navarro, C. (2006). Mayors and local administrators: A puzzling relationship. In: Bäck, H., Heinelt, H., & Magnier, A. (eds), The european mayor (pp. 287–309). VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
_ Ansolabehere, S., & Snyder, J. M. (2006). Party control of state government and the distribution of public expenditures. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 108(4), 547-569. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2006.00470.x
_ Arulampalam, W., Dasgupta, S., Dhillon, A., & Dutta, B. (2009). Electoral goals and center-state transfers: A theoretical model and empirical evidence from India. Journal of Development Economics, 88(1), 103 – 119. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2008.01.001
_ Avellaneda, C.N. (2012). Do politics or mayors’demographics matter for municipal revenue expansion? Public Management Review, 14(8), 1061–1086. https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2012.662442
_ Biryanto, B., Hubeis, A.V., Matindas, K., & Ma’mun, S. (2018). The influence of communication skills towards job performance of the state civil apparatus. Jurnal Studi Pemerintahan, 9(3), 393–419. https://doi.org/10.18196/jgp.9386
_ Blanchard, K. (2001). A retrospective of leadership theory: Situational leadership and situational leadership II. Ken Blanchard Companies.
_ Boex, J., & Yilmaz, S. (2015). Local governance institutions comparative assessment framework. The Local Public Sector Initiative.
_ Borraz , O., & Peter, J. (2004). The transformation of urban political leadership in western europe. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 28(1), 107 – 120. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0309-1317.2004.00505.x
_ Brollo, F., & Nannicini, T., )2012(. Tying your enemy's hands in close races: The politics of federal transfers in Brazil. Am. Polit. Sci. Rev., 106(4), 742–761. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055412000433
_ Brollo, F., & Troiano, U. (2016). What happens when a woman wins an election? Evidence from close races in Brazil. Journal of Development Economics, 122, 28–45. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2016.04.003
_ Burtch, P. (2011). Effect of leadership flexibility and effectiveness on city manager tenure [Doctoral dissertation, Walden University]. Minneapolis.
_ Corbin, J., & Strauss, A. (1990). Grounded theory research: Procedures, canons, and evaluative criteria. Qualitative Sociology, 13(1), 3-21.
_ Corbin, J., & Strauss, A. (2015). Basics of qualitative research; Tchniques and procedures for developing grounded theory. Sage.
_ Curto-Grau, M. Solé-Ollé, A. & Sorribas-Navarro, P. (2012). Partisan targeting of inter-governmental transfers & state interference in local elections: evidence from spain. Fiscal Federalism.
_ Demir, T., & Reddick, . G. (2015). Political orientation and policy involvement of city managers: An empirical study of the value-activity relationship. Public Organization Review, 15(4), 581-598. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11115-014-0290-y _ Egner, B., & Heinelt, H. (2008). Explaining the differences in the role of councils: An analysis based on a survey of mayors. Local Government Studies, 34(4), 529–544. https://doi.org/10.1080/03003930802217504
_ Feierherd, G. (2020). How mayors hurt their presidential ticket: Party brands and incumbency spillovers in Brazil. The Journal of Politics, 82(1), 195–210. https://doi.org/10.1086/705742
_ Ferreira, I., & Bugarin, M. (2005). Transferências voluntárias no federalismo fiscal brasileiro: Efeito do ciclo fiscal de meio de mandato sobre as eleições municipais. (Voluntary transfers in Brazilian fiscal federalism: The midterm fiscal effect on municipal elections). In: ESAF (org.), Finanças públicas: IX Prêmio Tesouro Nacional IX. Brasília, ESAF.
_ Ferreira, I., & Bugarin, M. (2007). Transferências voluntárias e ciclo político-orçamentário no federalismo fiscal brasileiro (Voluntary transfers and political budget cycles in Brazilian fiscal federalism). Revista Brasileira de Economia, 61(3), 271-300.
_ Frederickson, G.H. (1999). The repositioning of American public administration. Political Science and Politics, 32, 701-711. https://doi.org/10.2307/420159
_ Gerber, E.R., & Hopkins, D.J. (2011). When mayors matter: Estimating the impact of myoral partisanship on city policy. American Journal of Political Science, 55(2), 326-339. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00499.x
_ Graham, K. (2018). Leading Canada’s cities? A study of urban mayors [Doctoral dissertation, Western University]. London, Canada.
_ Greasley, S., & Stoker, G. (2008). Mayors and urban governance: Developing a facilitative leadership style. Public Administration Review, 68(4), 722-730. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25145654
_ Hessami, Z. (2018). Accountability and incentives of appointed and elected public officials. Review of Economics and Statistics, 100(1), 51-64. https://doi.org/10.1162/REST_a_00684
_ Heinelt, H., Hlepas, NK. (2006). Typologies of local government systems. In: Bäck, H., Heinelt, H., Magnier, A. (eds), The european mayor (pp. 21-42). VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-90005-6_2
_ Howell, J.P., & Costley, D.L. (2006). Understanding behaviors for effective leadership (2nd ed). Pearson Prentice Hall. _ Jan Čopík, R.K., & Jaroslav Č. (2021). Mayors as a variable in typologies of local governments: A case study of the Czech Republic. Local Government Studies, 47(2), 167-185. https://doi.org/10.1080/03003930.2019.1699069
_ John, P., & Cole, A. (1999). Political leadership in the new urban governance: Britain and France compared. Local Government Studies, 25(4), 98–115. https://doi.org/10.1080/03003939908433969
_ Koprić, I., Hlynsdóttir, E.M., Džinić, J., & Borghetto, E. (2018). Institutional environments and mayors’ role perceptions. In: Heinelt, H., Magnier, A., Cabria, M., Reynaert, H. (eds), Political leaders and changing local democracy (pp.149-172). Palgrave Macmillan.
_ Kotarba, B. (2016). Problem of cooperation between bodies of Polish municipalities. Środkowoeuropejskie Studia Polityczne, 1, 209-229. https://doi.org/10.14746/ssp.2016.1.10
_ Kuć-Czajkowska, K.A., Wasil, J., & Sidor, M. (2017). Consequences of electoral system for urban self-governments in Poland – selected problems. Acta Politica Polonica, 3(41), 31- 53. https://doi.org/10.18276/ap.2017.41-03
_ Ladner, A., Keuffer, N., Baldersheim, H., Hlepas, N.K., Swianiewicz, P., Steyvers, K., & Navarro, C. (2019). Patterns of local autonomy in Europe. Springer International Publishing.
_ Lara, E.B., & Torbo, M.S. (2018). Tactical distribution in local funding: The value of an aligned mayor. European Journal of Political Economy, 56, 74-89. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2018.07.006
_ Leach, S., & Wilson, D. (2000). Local political leadership. The Policy Press.
_ Magar, E. (2012). Gubernatorial coattails in Mexican congressional elections. Journal of Politics, 74(2), 383–99. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022381611001629
_ Mahfudnurnajamudin, I., Baharuddin S., Muhklis, S., & Suriyanti, M. (2020). Influence of leadership owne, external environment, and unique capabilities to innovation dperformance Makassar city smart city manager. IOSR Journal of Business and Management (IOSR-JBM), 22(8), 1-17. https://doi.org/10.9790/487X-2208020117
_ Miller, H.T. (1993). Everyday politics in public administration. American Review of Public Administration, 23(2), 99–116. https://doi.org/10.1177/027507409302300202
_ Municipal Research & Services Center of Washington (2021). Mayor & Councilmember handbook. Association of Washington Cities and Municipal Research & Services Center of Washington.
_ Nalbandian, J., O’Neill, R., Wilkes, M. J., & Kaufman, A. (2013). Contemporary challenges in local government: Evolving roles and responsibilities, structures, and processes. Public Administration Review, 73(4), 567–574. https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.12059
_ Oliver, M. (2012). How to be an effective city manager: Narrative insight from leaders. [Doctoral dissertation, University of Texas]. Arlington.
_ Park, C. (1998). The enduring campaign networks of Tokyo’s Shitamachi districts. In Hideo O. (ed.), How electoral reform boomeranged: Continuity in Japanese campaigning style (pp. 59–96). Japan Center for International Exchange.
_ Purnendra, J. (2004). Local political leadership in Japan: A harbinger of systemic change in Japanese politics? Policy and Society, 23(1), 58-87. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1449-4035(04)70027-2
_ Rocha, F. Ines, V., Orellano, F., & Bugarin, K. (2018). Elected in a close race: Mayor’s characteristics and local public finances. Economia, 19(2), 149–163. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econ.2017.10.005
_ Scheiner, E. (2006). Democracy without competition in Japan: Opposition failure in a one-party dominant state. Cambridge University Press. _ Sharma, R., Kansal, M., & Paliwal, P. (2012). Effective and efficient teamwork makes things happen more than anything else in organizations. International Journal of Social Sciences And Interdisciplinary Research, 1(8), 154–172.
_ Sparrow, G. (1984). The emerging chief executive: The San Diego experience. National Civic Review, 74, 538–47. _ Stillman, R. (1977). The city manager: Professional helping hand, or political hired hand? Public Administration Review, 37(6), 659-670. https://doi.org/10.2307/975334
_ Stone, C. (1989). Regime politics. University Press of Kansas. _ Suddaby, R. (2006). From the editors: What grounded theory is not. Academy of Management Journal, 49(4), 633-642. https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2006.22083020
_ Svara, J.H. (1994). Redefining leadership in local government: The facilitative model. In James H. Svara (ed.), Facilitative leadership in local government (1–36). Jossey-Bass.
_ Svara, J.H. (2003). Effective mayoral leadership in council-manager cities: Reassessing the facilitative model. National Civic Review, 92(2), 157-172. https://doi.org/10.1002/ncr.14
_ Sweeting, D. (2002). Leadership in urban governance: The mayor of London. Local Government Studies, 28(1), 3–20. https://doi.org/10.1080/714004134
_ Sweeting, D. (2003). How strong is the Mayor of London? Policy & Politics, 31(4), 465-78. https://doi.org/10.1332/030557303322439353.
_ Syahreza, D.S., Lumbanraja, P., Dalimunthe, R.F., & Absah, Y. (2017). Compensation, employee performance, and mediating role of retention: A study of differential semantic scales. European Research Studies Journal, 20(4), 151–159. https://doi.org/10.35808/ersj/825
_ Zhang, Y., & Feiock, R. (2009). City managers’ policy leadership in council-manager cities. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 20(2), 461-476. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mup015
Journal of Fine Arts: Architecture & Urban Planning
Volume 29, Issue 4
February 2025
Pages 43-58

Files

Share

How to cite

Statistics